

Hardening Enterprise Linux

Securing your Linux distribution

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Toshaan Bharvani @ VanTosh

- From Antwerp, Belgium
- Self-employed engineer/trainer (available for hire)
- Involved with Enterprise OS : RHEL/CentOS, IBM AIX, SLES, ...
- Likes to keep everything secure : SELinux, WebSec, ...
- Lives in a virtual world : KVM, PowerVM, z/VM, Xen, LXC, ...
- Likes automation : Ansible, Puppet, ...
- Works on both hardware and software side
- Wants to take over the world
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Hardware

Physical Hardware

Hardware

Software

sVirt

Conclusion

The End

- Set up a BIOS/UEFI/microcode/bootloader password
- Restrict booting to your boot device only
- Lock your machines to the rack
- Disable USB support on the server
- Disable VGA output
- Configure your management port and secure it
- Install your OS/software on an installation site

Virtual Hardware

- CPU
 - Hyperthreading
 - Logical mapping
 - Pinning
- Memory
 - Dedicated
 - Ballooning
 - Backing pages
- Networking
 - Dedicated
 - Shared

Hardware

Software

sVirt

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Software

- Install only what you require on that system
 - Minimal bare install is about 218 packages
- Encrypt all data and trafic
 - Also the data going over “trusted” networks
 - Use end-to-end encryption
- Seperate and segregate functions
- Use different networks for isolation
- Grant the least priviliges required
- You do not need a graphical interface
- Disable all unnecessary services

Disk

- Partition your disk
 - boot partition : /boot/
 - root partition : /
 - home partition : /home
 - log partition : /var/log
 - temp partition : /tmp
 - data partition : ...
- Make use of `nosuid`, `noexec`, `nodev` on partition that do not require this
- Use drive or file system encryption
- Protect GRUB
 - Password : `password --encrypted <password>`
 - Redirect to secure console

- Enable only IP stack relevant to your network
- Make use of physical or virtual tagging
- Create VLAN enabled network devices
- Close all unnecessary ports : input and output
- (Rate)Limit your port for (ab)usage

sysctl : networking

- Don't reply to broadcasts (DDoS)
- Protect from bad icmp error messages
- Protect against SYN flood attack
- Log all suspicion packets : spoofed, source routed, and redirects
- Don't allow source routed packets
- Enable reverse path filtering
- Disable outside alterations to the the routing tables
- Disable forwarding and redirects (router)

SSH protection

- Larger key lengths
- Run on a different port then 22
- Disable protocol 1
- Increase log level to display key login
- Short login grace time
- Disable root login over ssh
- Enable strict mode (make sure your permissions and labels are correct)
- Set a maximum authentication tries per login session
- Set a maximum number of session a user can login
- Enable public key authentication and disable password authentication
- Disable empty password login
- Only give certain users ssh access

Login access

- Do not allow changing the kernel bootup
- Secure access to runlevel 1
- Disable active consoles
- Disable the three finger salute
- Restrict root console login
- Disable unnecessary users
- Use sudo and logging to track your root access
- Only give sudo tty to users that really require it

Hardware

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
Conclusion

The End


3

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
History : Before Virtualization




Present : After Virtualization



Virtualization Threat



Internals to threat model



sVirt : SELinux for libvirt

Hardware

Software

sVirt

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The End

- Kernel based Mandatory Access Control
- Based on SELinux MLS
- Multi-Category Security (MCS)
- Uses libvirt library
- It confines VM's in compartments

sVirt Labels (1)

Hardware

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sVirt

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The End

- Processes : `system_u:system_r:svirt_t:MCS1`
 - MCS1 is a randomly selected MCS field. Currently approximately 500,000 labels are supported.
- Image : `system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:MCS1`
 - Only `svirt_t` processes with the same MCS fields are able to read/write these image files and devices.
- Shared Read/Write Content :
`system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0`
 - All `svirt_t` processes are allowed to write to the `svirt_image_t:s0` files and devices.

sVirt Labels (2)

Hardware

Software


sVirt

Conclusion

The End

- Shared Shared Read Only content :
system_u:object_r:svirt_content_t:s0
 - All svirt_t processes are able to read files/devices with this label.
- Image : system_u:object_r:virt_content_t:s0
 - System default label used when an image exits. No svirt_t virtual processes are allowed to read files/devices with this label.

sVirt model



Labelling VM's

Hardware

Software

sVirt

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- Label VM images
- Assigning a VM a label

```
<seclabel type='static' model='selinux'>  
<label>system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:category,category</label>  
<imagelabel>system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:category,category</imagelabel>  
</seclabel>
```

- Changing SELinux file label

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Conclusion

Conclusion





Thank You



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